Abstract
from the 1950s to the late 1970s, China used gifts of arms to compete with the Soviet Union and to expand influence among Third World countries. Limited within the periphery and semiperiphery of the world system (Wallerstein 2010) , this strategy was mainly driven by the newlyborn regime's concern over its relative isolation. In Phase Two, between the late 1970s and the end of the 1990s, China retreated from this strategy and used arms exports mainly to assist national developmental projects. Only in Phase Three, beginning in the 2000s, does evidence support the emergence of a global strategy that attempts to extend China's economic, political, and possibly military outreach. This strategy does not mean that, due to space opened by U.S. decline, China has fully cemented itself as a global power vying for hegemony. However, it does illustrate that China has organized itself internally to formulate a globally-focused agenda. In the medium-term, China could extend its influence in regions where U.S. domination is relatively weak. China's political institutions' growing capacities to formulate, carry out, and maintain a coherent global strategy, as shown in Phase Three, contrast with the decline in such capacities on the part of the United States, as some recent work has argued (Mizruchi and Hyman 2014; Lachmann 2014b ).
Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics of World Power
Scholars have long sought to explain the changes in a state's position in the global hierarchy, and World-Systems Theory has made important contributions to this dialogue. To understand the interstate division of labor and political centralization and decentralization, world-systems analysis focuses on the international dynamics that determine a state's position in the world. It divides the world-system into two major components: a world economy based on a division of labor between the core and the periphery, and an interstate system through which the core politically dominates the periphery (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1967; Arrighi 1994; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Wallerstein 2010) . Although the core-periphery hierarchy cannot be reduced to economic relations, the logic of capitalist production and accumulation is usually viewed as the key driver for changes in a state's structural position within the world system (Arrighi 1994; Wallerstein 2010; Babones 2015) . Therefore, from a world-systems perspective, signs of economic contraction (e.g., falling rates of profit, rise of unemployment) are indicators of a deteriorating structural crisis within the world economy.
This crisis could upset the preexisting order of the interstate system, cause upward or downward mobility in the world system hierarchy, or even shake the primacy of the current hegemon and lead to the transition towards a new power center (Wallerstein 1984 (Wallerstein , 2002 Arrighi 1994 ). Meanwhile, processes in local societies matter only when integrated into the macro-level world system. 2 Actions by various social groups are seen mainly as responses to structural dynamics of the world economy and the interstate political system, rather than as being endogenously generated in the local context. Consequently, the world-systems perspective has difficulty accounting for policies and strategies that are generated by internal social and political
relations, yet impact a state's position in the world economy and the interstate system.
However, later research has demonstrated that domestic economic and political dynamics are not merely reflections of and responses to international dynamics. Instead, they also matter in shaping a national actor's structural position and leading to its changes in the global system.
Focusing on the decline of the United States, researchers have found that the endogenous dynamics of falling domestic productivity (Knudsen 2014) , growing elite fragmentation (Mizruchi and Hyman 2014; Lachmann 2014b) , and the heterogeneity of American political culture (Roxborough and Levy 2014) each have contributed to U.S. decline. These domestic social processes help remake the national balance of power among political institutions, capitalist factions, and labor, which reconstruct the U.S. state's capacity to make and carry out coherent and effective strategies to defend its supremacy. One important contribution of this strand of research is that it underscores that even a world hegemon should not be assumed to be a monolithic national actor. On the contrary, a global power, similar to Julian Go's conception of empire, should be viewed as containing "conflicting tendencies, tactics and techniques, and multiple modalities of power"
(2011:240).
Therefore, even as a world hegemon, a national actor's capacity to formulate and coherently pursue a global agenda may not be taken for granted. Instead, it should be examined under the assumption that this capacity is continuously being threatened by alternative tendencies and agendas of multiple local, national, and international actors. These actors choose their next moves in response to specific local and international contexts that are only partially shaped by world power relations. Meanwhile, their actions may contribute to reconstructing the international context in which world powers are situated and to which they must respond. Thus far, the literature emphasizes the politico-economic sphere of world power relations.
But as some authors have contended, a dimension of global militarism is also important to the dynamics. For example, global wars are usually generated by structural changes in the world system, or "civilization" in David Wilkinson's terminology (Modelski and Thompson 1988; Hardt and Negri 2005; Wilkinson 1987 Wilkinson , 1995 . Furthermore, from a world-systems perspective, power transitions are always punctuated by global war. Triumph over the competitor gives the winner a chance to shape (and benefit from) a new world order, until the economic cycle of growth is exhausted again, and a new round of global military competition is triggered (Goldstein, J. 1985; Boswell and Sweat 1991; Nakajima and Thompson 1988, 1996; Thompson 1999; Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 1995) . Additionally, it is argued that military power is in play in the formation and arguable disintegration of U.S. hegemony. As the iron curtain descended at the end of World War II, military aid was wielded by the United States to construct a global capitalist order, so as to advance U.S. supremacy in Western Europe and East Asia (Block 1977) . However, the legitimacy of this order diminished with the end of the Cold War, especially given the extensive presence of U.S. military forces around the world. From this perspective, the assertive use of force by the George W. Bush administration was the neoconservative political elites' strategy to rebuild U.S.
supremacy under new circumstances (Gowan 2003 (Gowan , 2004 . However, the rise in U.S. militarism itself may have signaled a decline in U.S. influence in the economic, political, and ideological spheres.
By comparing imperialistic activities of the United Kingdom and the United States, Julian Go argues that the reliance on military actions as a "last resort" is a desperate move to compensate for a superpower's declining economic and political control in the world-system. This can only destabilize world order and undermine the current hegemon (2011). This body of literature helps address the roles played by global militarism in the historical conjuncture of hegemonic decline, which is usually overlooked. Meanwhile, an empirical gap remains in explaining how the military sphere matters, especially in regards to the intrastate dimension of how military policies and strategies are formulated and how military resources are mobilized. In this respect, examining more data will help researchers to better understand the military dimension in the current global context of U.S. decline.
In this paper, I argue that changes in a state's position in the world power structure is a product of interactions between the interstate dynamics of power relations and the intrastate dynamics of policy-making. In so doing, I contribute to the literature by filling an empirical gap in our understanding of China's arms transfer activities, which has rarely been examined. These data provide a window into the changes in China's internal organization to boost its position in the world-system.
The Chinese Arms Transfer Regime: Why is it Relevant and How Can it be Analyzed?
Conventionally, scholars view arms transfer as determined by the international hierarchy of power relations and technological innovation. Keith Krause contends that a state's arms transfers are primarily determined by its structural position within the global hierarchical system of arms production and transfer (1992). Furthermore, major powers have routinely used transfer in the form of arms sales and aid to forge and strengthen subordination on the part of a client country and to shape the world order to advance one's national interests (Sorley 1983; Krause 1991 Krause , 1992 .
However, this paper argues that arms transfer is also a sphere impacted by and reflecting a national actor's internal decision-making and resource mobilization. In this regard, the arms transfer regime provides a lens to see how China organizes itself internally and how it may attempt to extend its outreach and become a world power. (Chŏng 1978) . The split with the Soviet Union marginalized China in the communist bloc, leaving it with only a few communist regimes on its side (for example, Albania and North Korea 6 ). To break out of the diplomatic blockade, China sought to establish itself as the new leader and "thought center" in a "world communist revolution" against not only the old enemy, American imperialism, but also the new rival, Soviet "modern revisionism."
In a paper published in 1965, Lin Biao, who at that time was designated by Mao as his "revolutionary successor," called for Third World countries to unite and committed China's support for a world revolution against the West (Chen 2005) . The arms transfer regime was crucial in China's support of a "world communist revolution." Instead of selling weapons, China chose to send weapons as gifts to these Third World countries. The principle that "China will never be an arms dealer" was articulated by Mao in the 1950s (Yu 2003) . Qiao Guanhua, China's U.N. delegate and Foreign Minister, elaborated this principle in his speech at the Plenary Meeting of the twentysixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1971. In the speech, Qiao said, "It is our bounded duty to support the just struggles of the people of various countries…We provide free military aid to countries and peoples who are fighting against aggression. We will never become munition merchants, nor attach any conditions or ask for any privileges" (from Barnouin and Yu 2011:169) .
According to the official record, China did not engage in arms sales until 1979 (Yu 2013 ).
Mao's strategy of not selling weapons but offering military aid served the strategic goal of defending and securing China's position in the international system shadowed by the Cold War.
In this strategy, the arms transfer regime was given priority in Chinese domestic and foreign policies. Before the Sino-Soviet split broadened around 1958, annual arms transfers from China never exceeded 9 million TIV, and China was only the world's fourteenth largest supplier (SIPRI). However, this was also a costly strategy. First and foremost, it placed a heavy financial burden on China's national treasury, especially through foreign aid programs (Zhang 2006; Yang 2009; Yang and Chen 2010; Che 2012) . As shown in Figure 2 , the weight of foreign aid on the Chinese government's public expenditure rose drastically in 1960, the year of the Sino-Soviet split, in spite of China's own struggling economy. In the heyday between 1971 and 1975, expenditure of foreign aid accounted for more than 5 percent of China's public expenditure, and more than 1.5 percent of its gross national product (GNP). In comparison, during the Marshall Plan period, expenditure on foreign aid never exceeded 0.2 percent of U.S. GNP. 8 Mao's pledge to "never be an arms dealer"
was kept even when the Chinese economy was under stress. From 1959 to 1961, the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" developmental programs led to the three-year Great Famine in China, causing around 40 million deaths (Lardy 1987) . (Hao, Song, and Luo 2013) . At the peak in 1973, China signed foreign aid agreements worth 4 billion RMB and spent more than 5.7 billion RMB on foreign aid, which even exceeded the amount of U.S. foreign aid that same year (Yang 2009 ). serve political purposes. However, due to the heavy fiscal burdens, both regimes had begun to cut foreign aid programmes beginning in the late 1950s, while China's foreign relations remained largely dependent on foreign aid (Krause 1995) . 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 The weight of Foreign Aids in China's national economy Foreign Aids/Government Expenditure (%) Foreign Aids/GNP (%)
between the two communist powers, leaning towards one when its interests fit (Chŏng 1978) .
Vietnam, with Soviet support, even became a regional competitor to China in Southeast Asia in the 1970s, and tensions between the two countries finally gave rise to a border war in 1978 (Ross 1988 ).
After the mid-1970s, it became clear that it was unsustainable to finance a high level of arms transfers by the public budget. Indeed, the weight of foreign aid had already seen a sharp decline in the years before Mao's death in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping's return to power in 1977 (Figure 2) . In summary, from the early 1950s to the late 1970s, under Mao's principle that "China will never be an arms dealer," the Chinese arms transfer regime was strategically employed by the top leaders to exchange for diplomatic space and to secure China's position in the world. Political institutions in this period showed a strong capacity to mobilize a considerable proportion of domestic resources to finance this strategy. However, they also generated a heavy financial burden on China's public budget, which became severe towards the end of the Mao era. Finally, this phase ended around the late-1970s as arms transfer declined, along with China's outgoing foreign aid.
Phase Two. "China has no choice but to become an arms dealer": The rise and fall of a profitdriven regime While the weight of foreign aid in China's public expenditure had been in decline before Mao's death, fundamental redirections and new policies were introduced a few years later. In 1978, the Chinese Communist Party's Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee took place in Beijing. At the conference, the new CCP leadership signaled an embrace of economic reform.
In the following year, Deng reframed the idea of the "Four Modernizations." According to Deng's reframe, the defense sector was relegated to the last priority, after the agriculture, industry, and science and technology sectors (Frankenstein 1999) . In other words, the defense sector lost its privileged status in the national economy, and most importantly, its priority access to national resources. Between 1979 and 1981, defense expenditures were cut by one-fourth, declining from 22 billion RMB to 17 billion RMB (Mulvenon 2001 Both countries, plus Egypt, only increased arms imports from China after the Mao era.
Moreover, none of the three countries fit China's previous geopolitical and ideological preferences. In the Mao era, China's clients were mainly countries with limited access to advanced 10 For instance, at the All-Army Sideline Agricultural Production Conference held in Beijing in 1983, the military headquarters urged the military sector to further relieve the burden on national finance (Mulvenon 2001) . Also, in a report by the China News Agency in 1992, the PLA's pharmaceutical conglomerate was urged to "play a positive role in developing the army's production and in making up for the inadequacies in military spending" (Frankenstein 1997:194 Table 2) . The strategy to ease the financial burden facing the defense sector through commercial activities, including arms exports, worked to some extent. A proportion of foreign currency obtained through the selling of arms was used to fund defense development projects such as the reform of the aviation industry (Cheng 2011; Yu 2013) . On the flip side, this mode of defense production and transfer generated problems in resource distribution, defense innovation, and military discipline. In spite of a lack of know-how and advanced technologies, the defense sector was in a position to reap profits through its extensive political connections in the domestic market (Mulvenon 2001) . By the end of the 1980s, more than two-thirds of the workforce employed by the defense industry had worked for the civilian market, instead of defense production, and by 1994, civilian products accounted for 80 percent of military-owned production (Karmel 1997 ).
This focus distracted the military from professional duties and the defense producers from genuine defense production and innovation. The development of weapons slowed in the late 1980s, and many defense products in this period failed to meet the quality requirements of military end users (Karmel 1997; Medeiros et al. 2005) . It also generated disciplinary issues. One anti-corruption campaign in the early 1990s led to the closure of hundreds of military enterprises (Mulvenon 2001) . Even frequent political campaigns failed to stop rampant corruption and the other illegal economic activities 11 that continued to trouble the defense sector throughout the 1990s (Karmel 1997 ). The problem eventually penetrated into the national economy as a whole. By the early 1990s, the defense industry had become "one of the worst laggards in the economy" (Cheung 2009:111) .
As recorded in both databases, the quantity and value of China's arms exports dropped drastically in the late 1980s. From 1990 to 1991, arms sales shrank 36 percent (WMEAT 1992) 12 and continued to decline throughout the 1990s. By 1999, China's share of world arms exports had shrunk to less than 1 percent, from 4 percent in 1990 (WMEAT 1999 (WMEAT -2000 . To sum up, in the Deng era, China changed the focus of national policy from security to economic reform and development. Consequently, the defense sector lost its priority in accessing national resources and was urged to be partially self-financed. This policy shift opened the door for the defense sector to sell arms and to provide civilian goods and services. This strategy generated short-lived momentum for the Chinese arms transfer regime in the mid-1980s. After that, problems inside this profit-driven regime became obvious and dragged down not only the defense sector, but also the economy as a whole. As a result, the quantity and value of arms sales dropped sharply in the late-1980s, with the depression in the arms transfer regime lasting through the 1990s. Why is China promoting the "One Belt, One Road" initiative? As some scholars have pointed out, despite China's drastic economic development over the last three decades, its capital accumulation regime has recently experienced several structural problems in terms of its sustainability. China's export-dependent economy has internalized the global crisis of over-accumulation and falling profits (Hung 2008) . Without a robust domestic market, Chinese investors have to look abroad for 13 The official roadmap and information of the "One Belt, One Road" project is available at http://en.xinfinance.com/html/OBAOR/ (2015) . This is the reason why several analysts have already called this strategy the "Chinese Marshall Plan" (Stokes 2015; Pitlo III 2015) . This "plan" has been well supported by the arms transfer regime of the new century. Silk Road" (2015) . Also during Xi's visit, an announcement was made elevating the Sino-Pakistan relationship to an "all-weather strategic partnership," the highest level in China's diplomatic relations.
In short, with strengthened support from political institutions and the burgeoning economy, the military sector was prohibited from commercial ventures and was reoriented towards its professional tasks in the late-1990s and early-2000s. Unlike in the previous phase, GDP growth was quickly transformed into growth in military spending after 2000. A grand strategy aimed at extending China's global outreach mainly based in Asia and Africa gradually took shape and was finally formulated as the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, in the twenty-first century. During this phase, arms exports bolster this grand strategy. Specifically, arms exports are connected to China's interests in trade, energy, and raw materials, as well as geopolitics. This new pattern of arms transfer has both similarities and differences from that of the Mao era. Both regimes are globallyfocused, unlike the nationally-oriented regime in the second phase. Each has served one of China's grand strategies and strengthened its connections to the outside world, though to a degree more limited than in the Mao era. Also, both regimes are led and fueled by political institutions, which are willing and able to mobilize national resources to plan and support outbound arms transfers.
However, arms transfer in the third phase differs from that in the Mao era in important respects.
In the Mao era, China's support, in various ways including military aids to "communist brothers"
and other Third World countries was framed and declared as a moral obligation. It had the goal of securing China's position in a world shadowed by the Cold War. On the contrary, in the current regime, the narrative of "benevolent brotherhood" has been replaced by one of mutual benefits and articulation of China's interests. In the third phase, rather than a financial burden on the state, the arms transfer regime has become an organic component of China's globally-focused grand strategy.
Towards a World Order after U.S. Decline I argue that from the 1950s to the present, changes in China's arms transfer activities have primarily resulted from its evolving grand strategies. In Phase One, Mao's regime used gifts of weapons to compete with the Soviet Union in the communist bloc and to extend its influence among Third World countries. This strategy, though putting a heavy burden on the state, helped to expand the diplomatic space of the new regime, which was isolated at the time. Nevertheless, after the late-1970s, China retreated from this strategy so that it could concentrate resources on national developmental projects. Arms sales, therefore, were introduced in Phase Two to generate revenues that compensated for the reduction in monetary support from political institutions. This profitdriven arms transfer regime was put to an end in the late 1990s, when China restored its monetary support for its military and used arms transfer to extend its regional ties, mainly in Asia and Africa.
Only in this phase, a globally-focused agenda to boost China's presence and connections with local agencies in terms of trade, natural resources, and geopolitics began to emerge. Such a strategy has been the result of constant interaction between the evolving global context and the domestic dynamics that have framed the way China today deploys, mobilizes, and promotes its power and influence in the global system. These findings only partially support Arrighi's perception that U.S. decline could lead to China's ascent (1994[2010] ). The decline of the current hegemon has not yet created an opening for the most likely aspirant to world hegemony. Until now, China has only been able to expand its networks in regions that are marginal in the U.S.-led world order. Furthermore, Chinese arms sales have been disproportionately concentrated on the low-end market. However, evidence supports the emergence of a globally-focused agenda on the part of China as the United States declines.
Such an agenda was absent when U.S. supremacy was at its peak during the Cold War and when the United States became the single superpower after 1989. It suggests that U.S. decline has created an opening for China to engage in world politics in ways it could not before, and China has organized itself internally and formulated a grand strategy to contend for more power and influence in the world.
Whether or not China's current strategy will lead to world hegemony remains unknown.
However, one implication of this paper is that, while the absolute size and capacity of the U.S.
economy and military enjoys a notable edge over any other potential competitors, the United States may find itself at a disadvantage when it comes to the capacity to formulate, carry out, and maintain a coherent global strategy. Admittedly, this paper does not deliver a comparison of state capacity between the United States, China, and other potential contenders for world hegemony. Further empirical research is needed in this regard.
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